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ly followin the longrun, thoughverypopularin thepast,havebecomesome-
wha,tcontroversialin recentyears.Availablevidencefromthedevelopingcountries
doesnotseemto supporthe'trickledown'theory.It isbeingincreasinglyfeltthat
thesolutionto theproblemof povertydoesnotlie in meremaximizationof the
GNP.Economistshavenowstartedstressingtheneedfor 'directattackonpoverty'
[6, pp. 42-44] andfor specificpolicieswith growthimplicationsfor different
groupsin theSociety[2,p.xiii]. Redistributionof incomeamongdifferentgroupsis
thereforemergingasanimportantpolicyobjectiveinmanydevelopingcountries,
includingPakistan.




madeprimarilyby therich,andif incomeis transferred.fromtherichto thepoor,
thelatterwouldconsumemostof it becauseof theirhighermarginalpropensityto
consumeandthiswouldadverselyaffecthefuturegrowthof theeconomy.Butthis
is onlyonesideof thepicture-thenegativeside.Incomeredistributionhasanother
importanteffect- thedemandeffect.It isarguedthataredistributionof incomein
favourof thepoormayincreasethegrowthpotentialof theeconomybystimulating
thedemandfor domesticallyproducedandoftenrelativelylabour-intensivegoods.
Thefinalandtheneteffectof a redistributionpolicywill,of course,dependonthe
relativestrengthsof thesavingeffectandthedemandeffect.




FAO [4], Soligo(12], andCheema(1], in whichtheauthorshaveexaminedthe
demandandemploymenteffectsof incomeredistribution.ThestudiesbySoligoand
Cheema,basedrespectivelyon the datapertainingto 1963-64and 1971-72,




(i) consumptionexpenditureonanygoodisprimarilydeterminedby thelevelof a
family'sdisposableincome;(ii) relativepricesof differentcommoditiesdo not
changesignificantly,andforthepurposeof thisanalysiswe treatthemas fixed;
(Hi)peopledo not reducetheir workeffortsasaresultof incometransfers;and
(iv) there existsenoughunder-utilizedcapitalstock,andthereareno supply
constraints.
In orderto seetheconsumptioneffectsof inter-groupincometransfers,we





X,j =a, + b, Yj + U,j (1)
In X,j =a, + {3,In Yj + e,j (2)
where
X,j =Average xpenditureon commodityi by thehouseholdsin thejth
incomegroup;





tionswith the ordinaryleast-squares(OLS) methodwasnot expectedto yield






~ Nj X,j =~ Nj expo(a, + (3,In Yj)J J
~~X,j=~ Nj expo(a, + (3,In Yj)I I
(3)
(4)
1:1: N. X.. =1:1:N. expo
i j J IJ i j J
(a. + (3, In Y.)I J (5)







1. Jlransferof incomefromtherichest10percento thepoorest10percent
households.
Transferof incomefromtherichest20 percento thepoorest20 percent
households.
Transferof incomefromthe richest20 percento thepoorest30 percent
households.
Transferof incomefromtherichest30 percento thepoorest20 percent
households.
Theratesof incometransfersfor all thesepolicyalternativesweresimulated
between1 percentand5 percent.Therearedifferentwaysby whichtheincome
distributioncanbechanged.Wedonotwanttogointothediscussionof theactual






























As mentionedearlier,thedatagivenin theSurveywerefor twelveincome
groups,andthesegroupswerenotof equalsizes.Anotheradjustmentthatwemade
in thedatawasto changetheinitialclassificationi todecileswhichmadeit easier






A redistributionof incomefromtherichto thepoorcanaffectboththelevel
andthecompositionof theaggregatedemand.Whetherthetotaldemandand/or
demandfor certaincommoditieswill increase,decrease,or remainconstantafter
incomeredistributiondependsprimarilyonthedifferencesin themarginalpropen-
sitiesto consume(MPCs)of therichandthepoor,andtheincomelasticitiesof the




sumof squaredresidualswasappliedto comparetheresultsof linearandlog-linear
consumptionfunctions.2On the wholetheresultsfor log-linearfunctionswere
betterandarereportedin Table1.For the17commoditiesincludedin thisstudy,
2Thetestis discussedin Rao andMiller [11,pp 107-111]. The sumof squaredresiduals





Commodity ConstantTenn Elasticity R2
(a) (ft)
WheatandWheatFlour 1.548 0.441 0.999
(7.034) (13.392)
RiceandRiceFlour - 2.446 0.799 0.998
(-6.194) (13.524)
OtherCereals -3.467 0.776 0.988
(-5.316) (7.949)
Pulses -0.390 0.482 0.999
(-2.159) (17.820)
MilkandMilkProducts -0.946 0.829 0.999
(-2.407) (14.079)
EdibleOils -0.674 0.617 0.999
(-4.287) (26.202)
Meat,Fish,andPoultry -3.943 1.116 0.999
(-16.494) (31.195)
FruitsandVegetables -1.569 0.777 0.999
(-15.179) (50.305)
Gur,Sugar,Honey,andSugar -1.231 0.724 0.999
Preparations (-3.385) (32.946)
TeaandCoffee -2.556 0.739 0.998
(-6.916) (13.365)
TobaccoandChewingProducts -2.726 0.859 0.999
(-13.800) (29.038)
OtherFoodandItems -2.902 0.931 0.999
(-11.221) (24.039) .
ClothingandFootwear -0.736 0.767 0.999
(-8.151) (56.703)
PersonalEffects -8.018 1.359 0.988
(-39.453) (14.305)
HouseRentandHousing -2.829 1.054 0.998
(--8.749) (21.772)
FurnitureandFixtures -5.389 1.147 0.997
(-13.978) (19.874)
FuelandLighting 0.190 0.546 0.999
(2.325) (44.615)
























a little differencein thenumericalmagnitudes.In all casesweseethatincome
transfersfromtherich to thepoorleadsto anincreasein thedemandfor basic
necessities(i.e.income-inelasticgoods)anda decreasein thedemandfor luxuries
(i.e.income-elasticgoods).
Percentagechangesin aggregateconsumptionexpenditurewith respecto
variouspolicies,positivein allcases,aregivenin Table2.Theincreasein aggregate
consumptionrangesfrom0.046percentforincometransferatrateofonepercent
fromtherichest10percento thepoorest10percenthouseholds,to0.316percent
for incometransferata rateof 5 percentfromtherichest30percenttothepoorest
20percenthouseholds.Thenumericalmagnitudesof thechangesinconsumptionare
smallin all cases,mainlybecauseof thefollowingreasons.Firstly,incomepolicies
in thepresentcontextaffecta maximumof only30percenthouseholdsateither
endof theincomescale.Secondly,thelevelof totalincomeiskeptconstantthrough-
out theanalysis.Increasedconsumptionby onegroupis thusat thecostof con-
sumptionof theother.Thirdly,theratesof incometransferfor allpoliciesarevery
low. Greaterpercentagechangescouldbe obtainedonly by substantialincome
transfers.
Besideslookingattheoveralleffectsof variousincomeredistributionpolicies
on demandcompositionanothereffectof suchpoliciesthatwe investigatedwas
thatof intergroupincometransferson theconsumptionlevelsof householdsin
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differentincomebrackets.The resultsof t,hisexercisecorrespondingto all the
incomepoliciesaregivenin Table3. In thefirstpartof Table3,weseethatwhilea
one-percentincometransferfromtherichest10percenthouseholdsto thepoorest
10percenthouseholdsdecreasestheconsumptionof theformerby lessthanone
percent,it increasestheconsumptionof thepoorest5 percenthouseholdsby8.85
percent.The resultsaremoredramaticif therateof incometransferis takenas
5 percent.In thatcase,theconsumptionlevelof thepoorest5 percenthouseholds
increasesby asmuchas42.97percentandof thenext5 percentby 32.24percent
correspondingto a reducedconsumptionby therichest10percenthouseholdsby
lessthan5 percent.Inthenextpartweseethatwhenincomeistransferredfromthe
richest20percento thepoorest20percenthouseholds,theconsumptionlevelof
the poorest10percenthouseholdsincreasesby a percentagesomewhatsmaller
(31.25)thanthatin thepreviouscase.Butherethebeneficiariesalsoinclude11-20
percentof the poorhouseholdswhoseconsumptiongoesup by 19.46percent
(correspondingto a 5 percentincometransfer).Similarchangesintheconsumption
levelsof householdsin differentincomegroupsaregivenfor otherpolicieswhen
incomeis transferredfromtherichest20percentto thepoorest30percenthouse-
holds,or fromtherichest30 percento thepoorest20 percenthouseholds.It is
quiteclearfromTable3thatinallcasesthepositiveffectsofincometransfersforthe
poor aremuchstrongerthanthe negativeffectsfor the rich. If the marginal






1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 5.0
PercentPercentPercentPercentPercentPercent
FromtheRichest10%tothe
Poorest10%Households 0.046 0.069 0.093 0.115 0.137 0.212
FromtheRichest20%tothe
Poorest20%Households 0.060 0.089 0.116 0.114 0.170 0.269
FromtheRichest20%tothe
Poorest30%Households 0.056 0.080 0.106 0.132 0.158 0.251
FromtheRichest30%tothe
Poorest20%Households 0.077 0.110 0.142 0.175 0.205 0.316
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Thenextquestionthatarisesishowto determinewhetheraparticularpolicy






whereC .N , andN denote,respectively,totalconsumptionexpenditureof then n




ly highervaluesastherateof incometransferwasincreasedfromI percento 5
percent.









ductivityis nowwellrecognizedin economicliterature.It isarguedthatindevelop-
ingcountriesanincreaseinprivateconsumptionmayhavepositiveffectonproduc-




evidence.In theirstudyabouttheeffectsof variousdeterminantsof labourquality,
GalensonandPyatt[5] havefoundthatof allthevariablesincludedintheirmodel,
levelof nutrition,as measuredby the dailycaloriesavailableperhead,hasthe
greatestimpactonthegrowthof output.
As statedearlier,thenetincreasein theaggregateprivateconsumptioni all
thecasesis verysmall.This impliesthatthecorrespondingreductionin personal
savingswillalsobeverysmall.Assumingthatthereis nosignificantchangeinbusi-
nessandgovernmentsavings,incometransfersfromtherichto thepoorwillleadto






Policy (Quantiles) 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 5.0%
Transferof Poorest5% 8.83 13.19 17.52 21.82 26.1142.97
Incomefromthe 6-10% 6.57 9.84 13.07 16.30 19.5232.24
Richest10%to 91-95% -0.88 -1.33 -1.77 -2.21 -2.65 -4.43
thePoorest10% Richest5% -0.92 -1.39 -1.86 -2.32 -2.78 -4.65
Households
Poorest5% 6.37 6.87 12.68 15.82 18.8431.25
Transferof 6-10% 4.74 7.10 9.46 11.79 14.13'23.38
Incomefromthe 11-20% 3.93 5.89 7.84 9.80 11.74 19.46
Richest20%to
thePoorest20% 81-90% -0.87 -1.30 -1.74 -2.17 -2.60 -4.34
Households 91-95% -0.88 -1.33 -1.77 -2.21 -2.65 -4.43
Richest5% -0.92 -1.39 -1.86 -2.32 -2.78 -4.65
Poorest5% 4.26 6.38 8.50 10.59 12.7021.00
Transferof 6-10% 3.09 4.73 6.32 7.88 9.46 15.67
Incomefromthe' 11-20% 2.63 3.93 5.27 6.55 7.84 13.02
Richest20%to 21-30% 2.21 3.38 4.42 5.51 6.61 10.98
thePoorest30% 81-90% -0.87 -1.30 -1.74 -2.17 -2.60 -4.34
Households 91-95% -0.88 -1.33 -1.77 -2.21 -2.65 -4.43
Richest5% -0.92 -1.39 -,1.86 -2.32 -2.78 -4.65
Poorest5% 8.12 12.13 16.11 20.07 24.01 39.54
Transferof 6-10% 6.04 9.03 12.01 14.98 17.9329.65
Incomefromthe 11-20% 5.01 7.49 9.98 12.46 14.9124.70
Richest30%to 71-80% -1.86 -1.29 -1.72 -2.15 -2.58 -4.31
thePoorest20% 81-90% -0.87 -1.30 -1.74 -2.17 -2.60 -4.34
Households 91-95% -0.88 -1.33 -1.77 -2.21 -2.65 -4.43
Richest5% -0.92 . -1.39 -1.86 -2.32 -2.78 -4.65























centrateit amountsto 85,691newjobs. Employmentgenerationis greaterin the
caseof incometransferfromtherichest20percenttothepoorest20percenthouse-
holdsthanin thecaseof incometransferfromtherichest10percentto thepoorest
10 percenthouseholds.Maximumnewemploymentis createdwhenincomeis
transferredfromtherichest30 percento thepoorest20percenthouseholdsata
rateof 5percentinwhichcaseit leadsto 119,736newjobs.
To summarise,we did not havecompleteinformationaboutthe labour















The resultsalsoshowthatthe consumptionlevelsof thepoorhouseholds
canbe significantlyincreasedwith incomeredistribution,withoutmuchadverse
effectsontherich. A policythatredistributesincomefromtherichest10percent
to thepoorest10percenthouseholdsata rateof 5 percentis expectedtoraisethe
consumptionlevelof the lattergroupby morethan30 percentat thecostof








distributionof total disposableincomewehavestudiedtheimplicationsof four





1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 5.0
PercentPercentPercentPercent PercentPercent
FromtheRichest10%tothe
Poorest10%Households 19,31328,58737,665 46,301 54,804 85,691
FromtheRichest20%tothe
Poorest20%Households 22,21533,08344,326 54,827 65,135103,605
FromtheRichest20%tothe
Poorest30%Households 20,75430,89340,995 50,688 60,650 97,670
FromtheRichest30%tothe
Poorest20%Households 27,57640,68052,768 65,180 76,604119,736
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fromtherichest30percento thepoorest20percenthouseholds.In thatcasethe
levelof employmentwouldgoup by 119,736jobstomeettheincreasedemand
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Note: The ratiosfor wheatandwheatflour; riceandriceflour;othercereals;pulses;meat,fish,
andpoultry;andfruitsandvegetablesarebasedon figuresfor employmentandthevalue
addedin theagriculturesectorfor theyear1978-79,takenfromPakistanEconomicSur-
vey [14]. Ratios for theservicesectorareusedfor houserentandhousing,andmiscel-
laneousitems. Theseratiosarealsofor theyear1978-79andarebasedondatacontained
in thePakistanEconomicSurvey[14]. For remainingcommodities,the ratiosarecom-
putedby takingrelevantcategoriesfrom theCensusof ManufacturingIndustries1975-76
[15].
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I wouldfirst liketo thanktheorganizersof thisconferencefor havingasked
metodiscussthismostinterestingpaper.
I hada feelingonreadingtheintroductionthatit couldhavebeensomewhat
morehelpful,atleastto me,if it hadprovidedamoreadequater viewof thelitera-
ture. It appearsto methatthisomissionmayhavebeenavoidedatnogreatincon-








to thepocketsof thepoor.If onewereto reviewthenumerousinstrumentsactually
employedby governmentsin LDCsto redistributeincome,theutilityofsimulation
exerciseslikethepresentonemaybesomewhatdiminished.For theseinstruments




of determiningtheirimpacton consumptionis renderedlargelysuperfluous.At
leastthismaybe consideredto be thecasefor therecipientsof thetransfers.Of
course,thisis notto denythatthevalidityof thepresentexercisestands,whenever
thetransfersaremediatedthroughcash.HereI mayperhapssuggestthatit maynot
beanaltogethert ivialexerciseto determinetheproportionsin whichincomere-
distributiontakesthetwoformsin theLDCs.
My nextcommentsriskbeingregardedassingularlyunprofessionalsincethey
referto someof theassumptionsemployedby theauthors.Whileofferingthese
comments,I amnotunawarethatit isalltooeasyto findfaultwithassumptions.
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(i) To beginwith,theassumptionabouttheconstancyof therelativeprices




thepoor. In suchacase,it appearstomethattheconsumptionfunction
to beestimatedwouldperhapsfarebetterif it incorporatedsomevari-
ablesrepresentingrelativeprices.
(ii) Continuingonthesubjectof assumptions,it appearsto methatin terms
of thesimplestmodelof householdecision-making,adirectransferof
cashwill leadto adiminutionof effortif, consideringreasonablehuman
beings,leisureis considereda normalgood. Theintuitivevalueof such
a predictionwouldbemanifestif weconsideredthecasesof suchcon-
sumersasapoorstudentwhoworksparttime,or awidowwhotakeson
domesticwork,or an indigentretireewhowriteslettersfor a fee. An
extremexampleof thiseffecthasbeenobviousin theoil-richcountries
whereincometransfershavereducedthelabourforce. In viewof the
aboveremarks,it appearsto methattheassumptionof unchangedeffort
on thepartof welfarerecipientsmaynotbesoinnocentastomeritbeing
leftunmolested.
(m) Further,considerthe assumptionof unchangedeffortsandinvestment
withregardto therich,whoundertheschemeof redistributionarelikely
to beforcedintocharity.I amtoldthatwhenphilanthropyisdemanded






labourcostwith itsattendantinducementsfor substitutionof capitalfor labour.
The lasttendencymayverywellbe impertinentenoughto undothegoodwork














followedby thebadnewsof a reversalof thiseffectif weincorporate,asSoligo
(1973),didthelabourrequirementsof thenot-too-commodioussheltersof therich.
Cline(1975),in hissurvey,haswarnedthatthisexercisecommitsthesinofdouble-
counting.I mustadmitthatonmyreadingof thepaper,I havemissedanysignsof
thisdouble-counting.
Finally,I wouldlike to drawattentionto aconsequenceof incomeredistri-
butionwhichhasnotbeenmentionedin theliterature,i.e.thepartialliteraturethat
hascometomynotice.Incomeredistributions,wheretheyaresubstantial,relikely
to raisethereservationpriceof labour. If sucha consequencematerializes,this,
